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Corporate governance of public utilities
In recent years, corporate governance has been one of 
the most discussed issues among authorities, politicians, 
business people, scholars and commentators. Although 
this attention is particularly due to well-publicized gover-
nance failures and subsequent regulatory changes, this 
topic is an area of longstanding interest. OECD (2004) 
de!ned it as a set of relationships between a company and 
its stakeholders. Corporate governance provides the struc-
ture through which the objectives of the company are set, 
and the means of attaining those objectives and monito-
ring performance are determined. 
In public utilities corporate governance assumes a 
much more complex and relevant role than in other com-
panies: market regulation, public-private ownership, poli-
tical connections and multiple agency relationships may 
change the company’s objectives and relationships, arising 
critical and interesting questions.
"is issue of the Network Industries Quarterly will 
look at di#erent aspects of corporate governance of public 
utilities. De Masi and Paci analyze the role of independent 
directors, focusing on corporate governance codes and 
independent directors’ in$uences over corporate objec-
tives. Menozzi and Vannoni discuss the issue of politically 
connected directors, their role and their value for !rms 
dominated by state shareholders. Smith, "ompson and 
Wright instead, debate the role of the governance mecha-
nism ‘Say on Pay’, comparing UK utilities and non-!nan-
cial companies. Cambini, Gugler and Rondi examine the 
dividend policy of EU telecommunications and electri-
city industries, showing di#erences between the sectors. 
Miriello and Castelnuovo study the mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A) activities in energy networks, looking at the 
e#ects of di#erent owners on investment propensity.
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Introduction
Recent corporate scandals and the !nancial crisis have 
focused an increasing attention on the board of directors 
and its composition. Directors play a signi!cant role for 
the success or the failure of any company, taking part in 
the strategy formulation and in the monitoring of mana-
gers’ behaviors (Tricker, 2012). Corporate governance 
codes, introduced in most European countries in the last 
few years, have developed a set of corporate governance 
guidelines aiming to have a more e%cient board of direc-
tors, avoid opportunistic managerial behaviors, protect 
shareholders’ interests and pursuit corporate transparen-
cy. Among these guidelines, an increasing attention has 
been given to the independent directors. Independent 
directors are board members without a%liations with the 
company (i.e. not current employees, without business or 
relatives relationships with the company). Due to their 
‘independence’ from the company and the management, 
they are believed to be willing to stand up to the managers 
and protect shareholders’ interests (Duchin et al, 2010). 
Speci!cally, by using their experience to understand how 
decisions would a#ect !rm performance, they may have 
an important role in advising managers towards decisions 
that are the most appropriate for the success of the !rm. 
"e common assumption about independent directors 
is that a high number of independent directors in the boar-
droom positively in$uences !rm performance. However, 
in the academic literature their empirical e#ect remains 
a ‘puzzle’ (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Yermack, 1996; 
Bhagat and Black 1999; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 
2008). 
Although most of these studies focus on di#erent in-
dustries, the role of independent directors is more relevant 
and more critical in the public utilities than in other com-
panies. In this article we discuss the role of independent 
directors on corporate boards, focusing on public utilities. 
We challenge the conventional wisdom regarding their 
in$uence on !rm performance and we suggest other cor-
porate issues on which independent directors may have a 
stronger e#ect.
!e debate over the independent directors
"ere is a long tradition of considering the inde-
pendent directors within the debate on corporate gover-
nance. "is discussion has paralleled the introduction of 
new rules and corporate governance guidelines regarding 
the increase in the number of independent directors on 
corporate boards1. Most of the European countries have 
enacted Corporate Governance Codes with similar requi-
rements, clarifying the convenience of a higher representa-
tion of independent directors in the boards. For instance, 
in Spain, the corporate governance code argues «the num-
ber of independent directors should not fall below one 
third of the total members […] "e primordial mission of 
independent directors is to ensure that the interests of the 
$oating capital are heard in the board of directors”» (1998, 
p.13). According to the Italian corporate governance code, 
«the number of independent directors should be adequate 
in relation to the total number of non-executive directors 
[…] and in the FTSE companies, independent directors 
have to account at least for one third of the total members 
in the board» (2011, p. 16). "e code speci!ed that inde-
pendent directors have to verify that potential con$icts of 
interests between the interests of the company and those 
of controlling shareholders and between the interests of 
the company and those of managers are assessed with ade-
quate independence of judgment2. 
"is convergence toward an increase in the number of 
independent directors has been reached by most European 
countries in the last few years. "is pattern re$ects the 
1 For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) changed corporate gover-
nance rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASDAQ), requiring majority of independent directors on 
the boards (Sharma, 2011).
2 Also Corporate codes in UK (1992, 2003) and France (1999, 2003) recom-
mended a higher number of independent directors on corporate boards.
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common view that independent directors are better able 
to contribute to positive !rm results. On the one hand 
corporate governance codes speci!ed clearly the opportu-
nity to have independent directors in the board, on the 
other hand academic research has questioned the tasks the 
independent directors are supposed to carry out. 
In the literature there are di#erent approaches to the 
role of independent directors.
According to the agency theory (Fama, 1980), share-
holders and managers have diverging interests. Speci!cally, 
shareholders ask managers to work in their best interests—
that is, to maximize their wealth. However, managers may 
take decisions based on self-interest rather than !rm per-
formance maximization. In this context, independent 
directors can be used as tools to monitor managers and 
reduce agency costs. Independent directors behave as su-
pervisors who serve shareholders’ interests by restraining 
management from pursuing their own interests. 
According to the stewardship theory, instead, managers 
and employers are not motivated by individual goals, but 
they behave as stewards whose interests are aligned with 
the interests of the organization (Donaldson and Davis, 
1997). Stewardship theory suggests that the main role of 
the board of directors is to advice and support the manage-
ment rather than to discipline and monitor. Hence, inde-
pendent directors give added value in a supportive role, 
providing industry-speci!c expertise or acting as advocates 
for corporate performance and !nancial viability. 
Resource dependency theory provides a third approach. 
According to it, the board of directors is a primary lin-
kage mechanism to connect a !rm with external resources 
(Pfe#er and Salancik, 1978). A popular and well-connec-
ted person (such as an independent director) in the corpo-
rate board provides con!rmation to the rest of the world 
of the good standing of the organization.
Hence, theoretically, independent directors may serve 
a crucial role within the company and their in$uences may 
be multiple. "e most discussed in$uence of independent 
directors is their e#ect on !rm performance. Speci!cally, 
independent directors may direct managers’ decisions at 
the maximization of !rm performance, positively in$uen-
cing !rm performance. Even though in theory this posi-
tive e#ect is widely accepted, empirically it is notoriously 
di%cult to !nd reliable evidence (Duchin, 2010). Some 
of the existing literature !nds no relationship (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 1999), others !nd 
a positive relationship (Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner, 
1997; Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani, 1996) and 
still others !nd a negative relationship (Yermack, 1996; 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 
1997). 
"is lack of clear results can been explained with a theo-
retical argument rather than empirical methods employed 
in the estimations of data. In theory, independent direc-
tors are particularly e#ective as monitors and custodians 
of stakeholders’ interests. Using their experience they may 
be more e#ective in building external relations, facilitating 
access to !nancial resources (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988), 
increasing innovation (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998) 
and contributing to the strategy formulation (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). Moreover, as monitor of corporate de-
cisions, independent directors may be particularly e#ective 
in improving the quality and level of corporate informa-
tion, increasing the disclosure of information and redu-
cing the asymmetry of information (Linck et al. 2008). 
"is in$uence gives the stakeholders the opportunity to 
better understand the !rm performance and directors’ 
professional background and experiences. 
Independent directors may be more relevant in the 
context of public utilities. In the next section, we discuss 
their importance in the public utilities. 
Independent directors in the public utilities
"ere are three features that make the public utilities an 
interesting context to study the in$uences of independent 
directors. "e !rst feature is the nature of the business 
activities. Public utilities o#er services of general interest. 
Speci!cally, they cover a broad range of di#erent types 
of activities (such as energy, waste, water, postal services, 
transport, and telecommunications), which are based on a 
set of common elements (i.e. general accessibility, standard 
quality of the service, consumer protection). According to 
the de!nition given by the European Commission (Green 
Paper, 2003), these services are fundamental for citizens’ 
life and their role is essential for increasing the quality of 
life and for overcoming social exclusion and isolation (pp. 
3). "ese services are also ‘universal’, meaning that they are 
made available, at an a#ordable price, to all consumers and 
users throughout the territory of Europe, independently 
of geographical location3. According to this de!nition, 
public utilities companies have to o#er «e%cient and non-
discriminatory services» which should be a#ordable and 
available to everyone. Nevertheless, public utilities are 
business organizations and some of them are listed com-
panies. As any listed company, they have to achieve good 
!rm performance and a rewarding return to their share-
holders. "is feature raises a !rst issue about public utili-
ties: the con$ict of corporate goals, which is making pro!t 
3 Cf. Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), 
OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 51.
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versus the universality of the service.
"e second interesting feature is the public-private 
ownership. Traditionally, a number of services of general 
interest have been provided by state-owned companies. 
Nowadays, public authorities increasingly entrust the pro-
vision of such services to public or private companies or to 
public-private partnerships and limit themselves to moni-
toring, and, where necessary, regulating. "e result is that 
within the same company private and public shareholders 
may coexist. "is heterogeneity of owners lead to the se-
cond issue of public utility: the diversity of interests and 
the possible con$ict of interests within the boardroom. 
"e public-private ownership creates a multiple agency 
relationship, which is the third feature of public utilities. 
As in any company with a separation between ownership 
and control, also in the public utilities the agency rela-
tionship between managers and shareholders may be an 
issue. However, beside this, the private-public ownership 
of these companies raises a second agency cost: the con$ict 
of interests within shareholders (i.e. State versus private 
shareholder). Owners diverge in their preferences for risk 
and returns, in their private costs of monitoring and in 
their strategic motivations for investing in a company. "e 
interests of State and local government may be di#erent 
from the interests of private investors. Moreover, a third 
agency cost exists: because of the nature of the activities of 
the public utilities, citizens are the primary stakeholders 
for these organizations. According to this view, citizens 
may be seen as principals, whereas local or central govern-
ments are the agents who should act as the representatives 
of citizens’ interest. However, local or central governments 
may be motivated by self-interest, such as the interests of 
political parties, the control of some industries, the reduc-
tion of unemployment level, the development of a spe-
ci!c geographical area, etc, rather than citizens’ interests 
(Calabrò et al. 2013). 
In this context independent directors may be par-
ticularly e#ective to address all these issues. Speci!cally, 
independent directors may be the e#ective custodians of 
stakeholders’ interests: monitoring managers and direc-
tors, they may suggest CEO and managers to take deci-
sions aimed at satisfying stakeholders’ interests. "ey may 
be particularly e#ective in reducing the con$ict of inte-
rests and the con$ict of goals, behaving as custodians of 
the governance process and as long-term, consensus-based 
decision makers (Higgs, 2003). 
Independent directors and "rm performance
In this section, we show the path both of the number 
of independent directors and of the !rm performance in 
the corporate boards of 43 listed energy utilities in Europe 
in the years 2002-2009. "ese years are particularly inte-
resting, because, during this period, corporate governance 
codes in Europe have increasingly stressed the importance 
of having more independent directors in the corporate 
boards. "is has led to a common behavior in European 
companies consisting in an increase in the number of in-
dependent directors4. 
We look at European countries subject to the European 
Commission’ guidelines regarding public utility services 
(Green Paper, 2003). Speci!cally, we focus on the largest 
European economies by GDP. "ey are France, the United 
Kingdom, Italy and Spain5. 
We followed the common practice of dividing direc-
tors into executive directors (current o%cers in the com-
pany), outside directors (not current employees but likely 
to have business relationships with the company, such 
as investment bankers and lawyers; o%cers in the recent 
past; or relatives of employees), and independent directors 
(outside directors without such a%liations). "e board 
composition (i.e. number of executive, non-executive and 
independent directors) has been taken as reported in the 
corporate governance reports. "ere are some possibilities 
that some directors, who are classi!ed as independent, 
are not truly independent. For example, some nominally 
independent directors may be employed by a foundation 
that receives !nancial support from the company, or some 
directors may have personal relationships with the CEO 
that a#ect their independence. Unfortunately, the data 
needed to capture these relationships are not available. We 
assume that such assessment has been done by the board 
of directors.
4 "e starting year (2002) is due to the availability of corporate governance data 
and the !rms’ attitude to disclose information about their board composition.
5 We exclude Germany. "e reason is that German corporate governance model 
is profoundly di#erent from the other companies in our dataset. Speci!cally, 
German companies have two separate governing bodies that operate independent-
ly: the supervisory board and the management board (so called “two-tier system”). 
"e management board conducts the day-to-day management of the company, 
while the supervisory board has the monitoring function. In the management 
boards every members are executive directors. Without heterogeneity in the board 
composition, we cannot test the e#ect of independent directors. Hence, we ex-
clude Germany and other companies adopting the two-tier system.
dossier
Variable Obs Mean Min Max
Values in number
Board size 271 10,68 3 23
Number of independent direc-
tors 250 5,30 0 16
Number of executive directors 255 2,28 0 9
Values in Percentage
Independent directors scaled 
by board size 250 49% 0% 89%
Executive directors scaled by 
board size 255 25% 0% 100%
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We use two measures for !rm performance: EBIT 
(accounting-based measure) and Market Value of Equity 
(market-based measure). 
In Europe, on average, board size of energy utilities is 
10, with a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 23. "e 
average percentage of independent directors in the boar-
droom is 49% and the highest percentage of independent 
directors on corporate board is 89%, whereas on average, 
the percentage of executive directors is 25%. 
 
Figure 1 reports the ratio between the average num-
ber of independent directors and the average board size 
among the countries. Italy shows the highest value. "is 
means that in Italy the average percentage of independent 
directors in the board is 60%, 45% in the UK, 44% in 
Spain and 36% in France. Interestingly, Figure 2 reports 
the path of ratio of the average number of independent 
directors over the average board size from 2002 to 2009. 
"e European countries in the dataset exhibit a similar 
path. "is empirical evidence shows the convergence, 
among European countries, towards a higher number of 
independent directors in the boardroom. Speci!cally, in 
these years, European corporate boards have followed the 
corporate governance guidelines that suggested an increase 
in the number of independent directors.
 
In Figure 3, we report, country by country, the path 
of the average percentage of independent directors in the 
boardroom and the path of two measures of !rm per-
formance: Ebit and market value of equity. "e average 
percentage of independent directors and the !rm perfor-
mance do not exhibit a similar path. It seems that there is 
no direct correlation between the increase in the percen-
tage of independent directors and the change in Ebit and 
market value of equity over the years 2002-2009.
Conclusions
Corporate governance—and, in particular, board 
composition—has been a topic of much attention lately. 
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Figure 1 – "e ratio between the average number of independent direc-
tors and the average board size among the countries (2002-2006) 
Figure 2 – #e path of the ratio between the average number of inde-
pendent directors and the average board size
Figure 3 – "e path of the average percentage of independent directors and the !rm performance
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One of the corporate governance mechanisms that has 
been widely discussed is the role of independent directors. 
Speci!cally, independent directors may be particularly 
e#ective in monitoring managers, advising CEO and ma-
nagers to take decisions aimed at satisfying stakeholders’ 
interests. "ey appear to be the best custodians of stake-
holders’ interests, ensuring the achievement of good !rm 
performance. It is not surprising that in recent years most 
European countries have introduced corporate governance 
codes providing guidelines to improve !rm results. 
"e role of independent directors has an additional 
signi!cance in the public utilities: the general and univer-
sal service, the maximization of shareholders’ wealth and 
the con$icts of interests make the independent directors 
to be perfectly eligible as a good corporate governance 
mechanism. 
"is paper underlines the debate over the independent 
directors in the corporate governance codes and their role 
in the context of public utilities. Although most scholars 
and corporate guidelines emphasize their in$uence on 
corporate results, their e%cacy may be measured on other 
corporate issues. Speci!cally, independent directors may 
be particularly helpful in managing two other important 
tasks within the boardroom. First, since independent di-
rectors make decisions based on information they receive, 
they may in$uence the level and the details of reported 
information. "ey may require a higher level of corporate 
transparency, increasing the accountability towards a wide 
range of stakeholders, such as shareholders, employees, 
customers and the society. Second, acting as a node among 
networks, they may build external relations, increase inno-
vation and facilitate access to !nancial resources.
More research is needed to explore these avenues and to 
evaluate how independent directors may a#ect other cor-
porate variables. Further qualitative studies can determine 
the e#ectiveness of independent directors looking at their 
competences and experiences, their personal networks and 
their reputation.
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